



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
17 October 2016

Original: English

Seventy-first session

First Committee

Agenda item 98

General and complete disarmament

Angola, Australia, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

Nuclear disarmament verification

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,¹ in particular the paragraphs relevant to verification, and the roles and respective mandates of the disarmament machinery bodies established therein,

Recalling also that paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) of the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,² step 13 of paragraph 15 of the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs" of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty³ and action 19 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty⁴ were all part of consensus decisions adopted by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁵

Reaffirming the shared resolve to further progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,

¹ Resolution S-10/2.

² See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

³ See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)).

⁴ See 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), part I.

⁵ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.



Reiterating deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,

Recalling the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI thereof,

Recalling also that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all,

Recalling further that all States parties to the Treaty commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations,

Convinced that, while verification is not an aim in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities will be required to provide assurance of compliance with multilateral nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,

Convinced also that, irrespective of different positions on the means to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, identifying and developing practical and effective measures of nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring will foster enhanced confidence and facilitate efforts to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 62/21 of 5 December 2007 on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, in which it took note of the report of the Panel of Government Experts on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification,⁶ as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 1990 and 1995,⁷ and recalling also the report of the Disarmament Commission outlining general principles elaborated upon or added to those stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,⁸

Mindful that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with its statute, shall carry out its functions in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies,

Mindful also of the role of verification in existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements, and of the importance of making use of existing capabilities of relevant international organizations and experiences and lessons learned, as appropriate,

Mindful further that, given the challenges associated with verifying nuclear disarmament, continuous capacity-building and technical development are critical

⁶ See A/61/1028.

⁷ A/45/372 and Corr.1 and A/50/377 and Corr.1.

⁸ A/51/182/Rev.1.

with a view to bridging shortcomings and establishing effective multilateral nuclear disarmament verification,

Noting initiatives and partnerships among Member States, such as the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, to enable active collaboration between States with and without nuclear weapons, in conformity with their international obligations, in developing practical methods that could contribute to the verification of irreversible dismantlement of nuclear weapons,

Noting also the contribution of representatives of civil society from the non-governmental, academic and research communities,

1. *Reaffirms* the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and calls upon other States possessing nuclear weapons to make further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons;
2. *Also reaffirms* that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties, and notes the development of broader partnerships and cooperative verification arrangements;
3. *Calls upon* all States to work together to identify and develop practical and effective disarmament verification measures facilitating the objective of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons through, inter alia, advancing, understanding and addressing technical challenges of nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring, including tools, solutions and methods and capacity-building;
4. *Calls for* the development of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures, which will build confidence and facilitate the advancement of nuclear disarmament efforts, and affirms in this context the importance of credible verification in providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments;
5. *Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission to substantively address nuclear disarmament verification;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on developing practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures and their importance in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, and to report back to the General Assembly at its seventy-second session;
7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants on the basis of equitable geographical distribution to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, taking into account the report requested above, which will meet in Geneva in 2018 and 2019 for a total of three sessions of five days each;
8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-second session an item entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification".